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Practice What You Preach: Microfinance Business Models
and Operational Efficiency
By JAAP W.B. BOS, MATTEO MILLONE *
The microfinance sector is an example of a sector in which firms with
different business models coexist. Next to pure for-profit microfinance
institutions (MFIs), the sector has room for non-profit organizations,
and includes 'social' for-profit firms that aim to maximize a double bot-
tom line and do well while doing good. We introduce a benchmarking
approach that accommodates these three business models and allows us
to estimate the efficiency of MFIs when they operate true to their busi-
ness model, but also when they drift away from their original design.
Using a simple model, we hypothesize that it is more difficult to operate
efficiently when pursuing a double bottom line. Our empirical results
for a large sample of MFIs are in line with this hypothesis: pure for-profit
and non-profit FMIs are more efficient than 'social' for-profit MFIs. In
addition, efficiency decreases for all MFIs when they move away from
their original business model. Increasing the risk of the loan portfolio
reduces efficiency and lending to woman increases efficiency. Finally,
our finding that multiple lending to borrowers is efficiency-enhancing
may help explain the mission drift in microfinance.
JEL: G21; O12; O16; C1
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I. Introduction
At the center of the current debate about the future of microfinance, is the
question whether microfinance institutions (MFIs) should be profit-oriented, pri-
vately funded, self-sustaining businesses or socially minded, subsidized, non-
profit organizations (Morduch, 2000). The discussion revolves around the often-
implicit disagreement regarding how MFIs can operate most efficiently, and with
that the lack of consensus regarding what constitutes operational efficiency in
microfinance in the first place. Should MFIs be compared based on their prof-
itability or based on their outreach, i.e., the extent to which they provide financial
services to those that were previously deprived of these services? The answer to
that question is important, as it helps MFIs direct efforts to improve their per-
formance and informs (institutional) investors and donors regarding MFIs’ (rel-
ative) performance.
Taken at face value, however, it appears that in the microfinance industry, there
may be room for more than one business model. For profit (FP) and non-profit
(NFP) firms coexist, and increasingly in the same (regional) market. As the mi-
crofinance industry has spread across the globe, MFIs have begun to span the en-
tire gamut between pure profit maximization and outreach. Moreover, whereas
some non-profit institutions have proven to be more profitable than for-profit
institutions, the latter sometimes outclass their for-profit peers when it comes
to outreach. Hence, it appears that microfinance accommodates not just two
very different business models (profit maximization, outreach maximization),
but also different mixtures of these business models.
The coexistence of these business models has and will shape the evolution
of the microfinance industry. In any market where for-profit and non-profit
firms coexist, questions about fairness, efficiency and competitiveness arise. And
views differ. Whereas some argue that non-profit firms can arise endogenously
in a neoclassical setting (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006) and may help over-
come an existing market failure (Hirth, 1999), others argue against comparing
for-profit and non-profit firms against the same (neoclassical) benchmark (Pauly,
1987), instead suggesting that utility maximization rather than profit maximiza-
tion explains behavior in markets with mixed preferences (Lin, Dean and Moore,
1974).
At the heart of this discussion lies a lack of consensus about the nature of the
production process in these markets. Do for-profit and non-profit firms produce
in the same way, or is it for example the case that the latter can benefit from
positive self selection and can acquire inputs such as labor at a cheaper cost,
thus compensating for their lack of pure profit maximization (Handy and Katz,
1998)? What we know is that the (non-)existence of a common benchmark is
important, as benchmarks (or best practice) creates strong incentives (Bogetoft,
1994). We also know that the notion of utility maximization is not necessarily
incompatible with pure profit maximization (Kroll, Levy and Markowitz, 1984),
and that the observed choices of firms with different preferences are likely to re-
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flect their utility functions (Smith, 1976). As Leibenstein (1966, 1978) argued and
Stigler (1976) contested, firms with different preferences can have a common
benchmark but show differences in performance as a result of effort discretion
and non-maximizing behavior (Perelman, 2011). It is Leibenstein’s notion of the
resulting X-inefficiency that we employ to assess the viability of different busi-
ness models in microfinance.
In this paper, we argue that MFIs have heterogenous preferences: some only
care about financial performance, whereas others are mostly oriented towards
social performance (i.e., outreach). Others are, quite literally, somewhere in be-
tween. Our view of MFIs allows us to develop and estimate a simple model
where institutions produce an output that maximizes financial performance
(yield), an output that maximizes depth of outreach (average loan size) and an
output that maximizes the breadth of outreach (the number of loans).1 Since
our production model also includes MFIs’ inputs (labor, capital), our approach
allows us to ask a number of important questions.
First, we ask whether and to what extent there is a trade-off between each ob-
jective (i.e., each output), assuming that all inputs have been used efficiently. At
the production frontier, how much depth of outreach has to be sacrificed for a
higher yield? Is it possible to combine increases in the depth of outreach, i.e.,
small average loan size, with a wider breadth of outreach? Our paper contributes
to the literature by estimating these tradeoffs while controlling for existing slack
in MFIs’ production in either direction. Doing so is important, as we may oth-
erwise over- or under-estimate trade-offs: think for example of an MFI that is
trying to maximize outreach (depth and width), but does so rather poorly. Not
accounting for that poor performance would lead to an overestimation of the
trade-off between financial and social performance.
Second, we ask whether the operational efficiency of MFIs depends on their
revealed preferences. Are MFIs that are purely profit maximizers more efficient
than MFIs that try to maximize outreach? Is there an optimal balance between
either objective? Our paper contributes to the literature by estimating the effi-
ciency of MFIs in a setting that accommodates their multi-output nature. Mea-
suring efficiency in this setting is important, as it allows both MFIs, investors
and donors to benchmark institutions given their focus on financial performance,
social performance or a mix of both. For example, an institutional investor wish-
ing to invest in microfinance as part of its CSR strategy can invest in the most
efficient among the MFIs that focus on outreach.
Third, and related, we ask how MFIs can become more efficient. After all,
the investor mentioned in the above example can also choose to invest in an
inefficient MFI, opting to boost its efficiency through engagement. How should it
do so? Is lending to women indeed a good way to increase outreach (Dowla and
Barua, 2006)? What is the nature of the risk-return relationship in microfinance
1In the microfinance literature, the focus on financial revenues is seen as a decrease in the affordability of
the loans and increasing loan size is referred to as mission drift.
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(Mersland and Strøm, 2009)? What is the effect of disbursing multiple loans per
client (Krishnaswamy, 2007)? Our paper addresses these issues in a coherent
framework, measuring the effects of operational changes and uncovering the
different business models that appear to explain the performance of different
types of MFIs. Importantly, our analysis can help repudiate the claim that a
panacea exists to 'fix' microfinance: what may work for one institution may not
work for another one. However, institutions with a similar output mix may be
able to learn from industry best practices.
In order to answer each of these questions, we estimate a multi-output, multi-
input production frontier. We use an output distance model (Cuesta and Orea,
2002), control for unobserved institutional differences using a 'true fixed effects'
stochastic frontier model (Greene, 2005a), and condition efficiency on a number
of choice variables following Battese and Coelli (1988). We use the Microfinance
Information Exchange (MIX) data, and compare 1,146 MFIs over the period from
2003 to 2010. Our analysis encompasses both strictly for-profit MFIs and firms
with a social mission.
Our results show that mission drift does not only decrease depth, but also
breadth of outreach, as evidenced by the negative output elasticity of average
loan size with the number of loans. In fact, this negative relationship becomes
more pronounced as the average loan size increases. Interestingly, on average,
larger loans will result in a lower yield on the gross loan portfolio. Larger loans
are also correlated with higher personnel and financing costs. We find support
for this finding in the literature, as Mersland (2009) shows that the lower oper-
ating costs reported by for-profit MFIs are just an artifice of larger loans. As a
matter of fact NGOs have lower costs per loan. According to Gutie´rrez-Nieto,
Serrano-Cinca and Molinero (2007a), NGOs that rely on voluntary work have
low personnel costs and thus are able to efficiently offer a large number of small
loans.
In addition, we find that, contrary to Hermes, Lensink and Meesters (2011),
MFIs can indeed combine the depth and breadth of outreach, and operate with
above average levels of efficiency. However, efficiency quickly decreases with
the loan portfolio. These findings are in line with the theoretical predictions of
Mersland (2009): NGOs and credit cooperative are more efficient as they are
able to lower the costs of market contracts. Such institutions are not profit maxi-
mizers and mainly operate via group loans, this makes them better equipped to
cope with highly inefficient markets and asymmetric information. Roberts (2012)
shows empirically that a stronger profit orientation leads to higher interest rates,
but is also associated with higher costs.
Finally, we find that lending to women and repeated lending increases effi-
ciency, whereas increasing the overall riskiness of the loan portfolio has a nega-
tive effect on efficiency. The former finding contradicts Cull, Demirg-Kunt and
Murduch (2007) and Mersland and Strøm (2011) who show that MFIs that focus
on lending to women are respectively less profitable and less efficient.
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The remainder of this paper continues as follows. In Section II, we review the
existing literature on microfinance and the performance of MFIs. In Section III,
we introduce our analytical framework, empirical model and estimation strat-
egy. In Section IV, we discuss our data set. Section V contains our results. We
conclude in Section VI.
II. Business Models in Microfinance
Once considered the panacea for pulling the un-bankable out of poverty, mi-
crofinance has recently come under heavy scrutiny from the public, the media
and regulators. The limits of the model developed by Mohammed Yunus are not
new to the academic literature. Issues of sustainability, trade-offs between social
and financial goals and more recently, efficiency have been the subject of exten-
sive research by both academics and practitioners. The body of research on mi-
crofinance is, nevertheless, very heterogeneous in terms of objectives, method-
ologies and empirical techniques. In this section, we review some of the main
findings.
Morduch (1999b), in questioning the self-reported success of Grameer Bank, is
one of the first to challenge the notion of microfinance as a sustainable solution
to poverty. When taking a closer look at the bank’s financial reports, he finds that
the repayment rates are not as good as they claim to be. Furthermore, he finds
that, despite reporting profits, Grameer has constantly been subsidized. The
findings of Morduch call into question the idea of microfinance as a profitable
and yet socially oriented business.
The original view on microfinance was that MFIs following traditional, good
banking practices would be the best at alleviating poverty. Morduch (1999a)
shows that the 'win-win' proposition is not realistic, both logically and empiri-
cally. Given the high costs of lending to the poor, the double bottom line propo-
sition can be sustained only if poor borrowers strictly care about access to and
not about the cost of credit (Morduch, 2000). Acknowledging that microfinance
cannot be profitable and fully socially oriented at the same time is at the origin
of what Morduch defines as 'the microfinance schism.'
From that point onwards, the debate on the role and the future of microfinance
is dominated by two contrasting views: institutionalist and welfarist (Brau and
Woller, 2004). Whereas both views assume that there is a trade-off between fi-
nancial and social performance, they draw different inferences. The institution-
alist view claims that in order to successfully provide financial services to the
poor it is necessary to prioritize financial sustainability. The welfarist view fo-
cuses on social performance and considers the reliance on donations as necessary
and justifiable, given the poverty reduction mission of MFIs.
The trade-off between financial and social performance itself, is mainly at-
tributed to the higher costs of giving out smaller loans. Von Pischke (1996) dis-
tinguishes between demand and supply side effects. On the demand side, as
the breadth of outreach increases, the probability of lending to risky borrowers
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increases as well, resulting in an overall riskier portfolio, with more defaults. On
the supply side, smaller loans will lead to higher costs, both fixed and variable.
This is a consequence of the fact that micro loans are information intensive and
have high monitoring costs (Conning, 1999). Fixed costs are not a problem for
sustainability as they can be lowered with economies of scale. Variable mon-
itoring costs could be covered by higher interest rates, but this might worsen
repayment rates. Poorer borrowers require smaller and more expensive loans
that will in turn decrease profitability.
Discussions about the trade-off between financial and social performance
gained momentum as a result of mission drift, i.e., the observed tendency of
MFIs to move toward richer borrowers by disbursing larger loans. Copestake
(2007) frames the decision in the context of a production possibility frontier,
where an increase in size leads to economies of scale, allowing the MFI to focus
on both depth and breadth of outreach. Since his model is dynamic, a current
decrease in social performance may justify an increase in the size of an MFI in
the near future. According to Ghosh and Tassel (2008), mission drift itself is the
inevitable response of effective MFIs to the entry of profit-oriented investors in
microfinance. Gonzalez (2010) and Mersland and Strøm (2010) show that larger
loans indeed reduce operating expenses and increase profits.
Nevertheless, empirically testing the trade-off between financial and social
performance poses a number of challenges. First, it is hard to distinguish be-
tween mission drift and cross-subsidization (Armenda´riz and Szafarz, 2010).
Second, a decrease in loan size often leads to higher interest rates. According to
Mersland and Strøm (2011), ”[T]he balance between outreach to the poor and fi-
nancial sustainability is to a large extent a question of charging sustainable levels
of interest rates since the cost of lending small amount is relatively high” (Mer-
sland and Strøm, 2011, p.3). They show that MFIs do not exercise monopoly
power and that the high levels of interest rates are caused by increases in input
prices and not by high margins. Cull, Demirg-Kunt and Murduch (2007) find a
trade-off between the size and number of loans disbursed, and show that even if
smaller loans have higher interest payments, they do not have lower repayment
rates.
Meanwhile, the trade-off may depend on institutional characteristics, and can
therefore differ from one MFI to the next. Mersland and Strøm (2009) look at
the effects of corporate governance on the performance of MFIs. They find that
most corporate governance characteristics and ownership structures have very
limited or no influence on measures of outreach and financial performance. Cull
and Spreng (2011) analyze the case of the privatization of the National Bank of
Commerce in Tanzania. They show that even if privatization was difficult, it has
led to increases in efficiency while maintaining the same level of outreach. In
this particular case outreach and efficiency are not negatively related.
A number of papers look more specifically at efficiency using Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Gutie´rrez-Nieto,
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Serrano-Cinca and Molinero (2007b) use multivariate DEA models to measure
efficiency of MFIs, finding relevant effects of country and NGO status. Simi-
larly Gutie´rrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Molinero (2007a) show the importance
of social efficiency assessment. Bassem (2008), uses a sample of mediterranean
MFIs to show that size has a negative impact on efficiency. Nawaz, Hudon and
Basharat (2011) confirm the result of Hassan and Sanchez (2009) showing on one
hand that MFIs with bank status specializing in individual lending tend to be
financially efficient and on the other hand that unregulated NGOs are more so-
cially efficient. Model specification is therefore critical in applications of DEA as
it is evident in Haq, Skully and Pathan (2010), who show that under the produc-
tion approach NGOs are more efficient while bank-microfinance institutions are
the best performers under the intermediation approach. Hermes, Lensink and
Meesters (2011) use a stochastic frontier production model to see whether depth
of outreach is related to inefficiency. They find that smaller loan size leads to a
decrease in efficiency.
Summing up, although we have come a long way in improving our under-
standing of the performance of MFIs, important questions have remained unan-
swered. In the presence of inefficiency, what is the trade-off between financial
and social performance for inefficient MFIs? Is there a trade-off between breadth
and depth of outreach? How do lending choices affect operational inefficiency,
and thereby the trade-off? In order to answer these questions, we now introduce
our approach to model and analyze MFIs’ performance.
III. Methodology
In this section, we introduce our approach to modeling the dual objectives
(profit-maximization, outreach) of MFIs. As the literature review in the previ-
ous section has shown, the potential trade-off between these objectives has been
analyzed at length. Our approach differs from earlier work because we start
from the premise that different institutions have different revealed preferences
regarding whether to maximize social or financial performance. In our model,
an MFI is not penalized for preferring one objective over the other. Rather, an
MFI is penalized (i.e., it is inefficient) if it is less successful than other MFIs with
the same revealed preferences.
Before we introduce our empirical specification in Section III.C, we first revisit
the notion of a trade-off between financial and social performance in microfi-
nance. In Section III.B, we explain how we capture those trade-offs with banks’
production set, consisting of a mix of outputs and inputs.
A. Preferences and output mixes in microfinance
Our objective is to model the production and efficiency of firms with heteroge-
nous preferences. We assume that all firms have access to the same technology
and produce the same outputs, albeit in different proportions. Also, we assume
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that the transformation is (weakly) separable in outputs. As a result, output
choices are assumed to result from preferences, since the utility firms derive from
a certain output set depends on these preferences.
For M inputs, N outputs and a transformation function T that satisfies the
usual conditions (Fa¨re and Primont, 1995), we define:
(1) T = {(X, Y) : X ∈ <M+ , Y ∈ <N+ , X can produce Y}.
Now let us consider both elements in the transformation process: the output
vector Y and the input vector X. First, we focus on Y. We assume that the pro-
duction of an MFI is weakly separable in outputs: an MFI can choose each of
its outputs, but reductions in outputs are proportional, i.e., it is not possible to
reduce one of the outputs while keeping the others constant. Furthermore, we
assume that within the set of possibilities allowed by the transformation func-
tion, the output mix is determined by the preferences of the MFI.
Since we are interested in comparing the efficiency of many MFIs, we can sim-
plify our exposition by normalizing the outputs in the vector Y, dividing each
output by the maximum value taken by any of the MFIs with the same input
vector X. For the resulting scalar Yˆ, we assume that the management of an MFI
i values its output mix with the following CES utility function (Dino, 2000):
(2) Ui =
ΣNn=1θn,iyˆ
1−ρi
n,i
1− ρi ,
where lower-case denotes logged variables, ΣNn=1θn,i = 1 and ρi ≥ 0.2 For now,
we assume that each MFI produces two outputs: yˆNP and yˆFP. For FP MFIs, we
assume that θFP ≥ θNP, and for NP MFIs, we assume that θFP < θNP.
In addition, we assume that ρNP ≥ ρFP; whereas FP MFIs may have entered
because of various reasons (diversification, green washing, etc.), NP MFIs are
assumed to have a more stringent mission.3 Since the parameter ρ presents the
degree of aversion against a balanced output mix, what can we learn about the
utility of MFIs?
To answer that question, let us start by considering NP MFIs. These MFIs are
assumed to be highly averse to a balanced output mix, and will give a higher
weight to the NP output in their utility function. Therefore, not surprisingly,
NP MFIs strictly prefer output mixes with higher weights for yˆNP. Does this
mean that FP MFIs strictly prefer output mixes with higher weights for yˆFP?
Not necessarily. To see why, let us first consider 'pure' FP MFIs, who are also
2By choosing the CES function, we assume that for each MFI ∂Ui∂yn,i > 0 and
∂2Ui
∂2yn,i
< 0.
3In a comprehensive study, Malani, Philipson and David (2003) paper investigate several reasons why non-
profit firms coexist with for-profit firms. They find that evidence in favor of altruism weakly trumps evidence
in favor of non-contractable quality. According to both theories, NP firms put less emphasis on pure profit
making, in line with our assumptions made here.
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assumed to be highly averse to a balanced output mix and, will give a higher
weight to the FP output in their utility function. As a result, for these MFIs things
are also clear-cut, and they strictly prefer output mixes with higher weights for
yˆFP, making them the antithesis of NP MFIs.
Table 1—: Utility, preferences and output mixes
Type of MFI Aversion Preference Utility ranking
NP MFI ρ > 0 θNP > θFP UNP
(
θ˜NP > θ˜FP
)
> UNP
(
θ˜NP = θ˜FP
)
> UNP
(
θ˜NP < θ˜FP
)
pure FP MFI ρ > 0 θNP < θFP UFP
(
θ˜NP > θ˜FP
)
< UFP
(
θ˜NP = θ˜FP
)
< UFP
(
θ˜NP < θ˜FP
)
'social' FP MFIs ρ ≥ 0 θNP ≤ θFP UFP (θ˜NP > θ˜FP) ≤ UFP (θ˜NP = θ˜FP) ≤ UFP (θ˜NP < θ˜FP)
Note: θFP and θNP are the actual weights from the MFI’s utility function, whereas θ˜FP and θ˜NP are the weights
resulting from the actual output mix.
Things change, however, when we consider 'social' FP MFIs, who want to do
well by doing good and as a result are not averse to a balanced output mix. De-
pending on their preferences, the preferences of their stakeholders and the extent
to which the need to make a profit becomes a binding constraint, 'social' FP MFIs
give equal weight to the NP output and the FP output, or put (slightly) more
weight on the FP output. So with what output mix do 'social' FP MFIs maxi-
mize their utility? In case there is uncertainty about ρ and the output weights,
the answer, as can be seen in Table 1, is not clear. Summing up, therefore, it
would appear that it is much easier for both NP MFIs and 'pure' FP MFIs to
know when and where to exert effort in order to optimize their output mix and
maximize their utility than it is for 'social' MFIs.
In Figure 1, we show the production possibilities set for a given input mix
and transformation function. Every point on the production possibilities frontier
represents an efficient combination of yˆFP and yˆNP. Any combination of yˆFP and
yˆNP lying under the frontier is inefficient.
From Figure 1, we observe the output mixes of the three different groups of
MFIs we have previously identified. NP MFIs focus on serving the poor and
therefore opt for a relatively high share for yˆNP. Pure FP MFIs mainly aim to
maximize profits, are more likely to be accused of mission drift, since they opt
for a relatively high share for yˆFP. And finally, social FP MFIs aim to do well by
doing good and consequently have the most 'balanced' output mix.
B. Preferences and production sets in microfinance
The next step is to establish what constitutes this output mix. We start from
the premise that total output Y for an MFI is the value added of the gross loan
9
Figure 1. : Efficiency, preferences and output mixes
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portfolio. We can then decompose Y as follows:
(3) Y ≡ Ry
1︸︷︷︸
Yield (Ry)
· GLP
NL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average loan size (ALS)
· NL
1︸︷︷︸
Number of loans (NL)
where Ry is the average yield on a loan, NL is the number of loans, and ALS is
the average loan size.
Increasing the number of loans (NL), enhances the breadth of outreach, mak-
ing microcredit available to a larger pool of borrowers. Lowering the average
loan size (ALS) increases the depth of outreach, making microcredit affordable
to poorer borrowers. Of course the affordability of microcredit also depends on
its price. The higher the yield on its gross loan portfolio (Ry), the more profitable
an MFI will be.
For now, let us focus on average loan size and the number of loans. Obvi-
ously, MFIs can have the same gross loan portfolio, but very different mixes: one
MFI may opt for a portfolio consisting of a small number of large loans, whereas
another MFI may opt for a portfolio consisting of many small loans. In the pres-
ence of economies of scale, a higher average loan size will increase profitability,
whereas a lower average loan size is traditionally seen as an increase in the depth
of outreach. Recent research (Gonzalez, 2010; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Her-
mes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011) shows that loan size is positively correlated
with profits and negatively with operating costs. Keeping the level of funding
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constant, MFIs that focus on social performance (outreach) will disburse a larger
amount of smaller loans compared to fewer larger loans offered by financially
oriented institutions. A higher number of loans therefore means an increase in
the breadth and depth of outreach, whereas a larger average loan size is often
argued to decrease outreach, reflecting mission drift (Ghosh and Tassel, 2008).
For now, if we frame the possible trade-off between average loan size and
number of loans as the choice between yˆFP and yˆNP in Figure 1, we first note that
the shaded areas in that figure represent the size of an MFIs gross loan portfolio.
In the figure, the 'social' FP MFI maximizes the size of its loan portfolio. The NP
MFI has a portfolio that is somewhat smaller, but contains more, smaller loans.
The 'pure' FP MFI also has a somewhat smaller portfolio, consisting of fewer,
larger loans.
Our second, and related observation is that in comparing MFIs in the manner
as displayed in Figure 1, we indeed account for the fact that they may have
different preferences. If an MFI is producing at point A or C, we will consider
it as efficient even if the GLP is maximized at point E. If fact both A and C are
optimal given the shape of the utility function. Higher costs are the result of the
decision to prioritise the number of loans rather than the loan size, this cannot be
considered an inefficiency. Points B and D represent instead inefficient output
mixes, because at each of these points one output dimension could be increased
without reducing the other.
Third, since Y = F(X), we note that we can rewrite equation (3) as ALS =
f (X)
Ry·NL . It is straightforward to see that
∂ALS
∂NL = − 1NL2
f (X)
Ry , which explains the
curvature in Figure 1.4
Of course, in Figure 1 we compare output choices given an MFI’s input mix. In
line with the intermediation approach that has become the standard in the bank-
ing literature (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), we assume that an MFI uses three in-
puts: financial capital (funds), physical capital (buildings, equipment, etc.) and
labor (personnel). These are measured as financial expenses (X f in), administra-
tive expenses (Xphys) and personnel expenses (Xlabor), respectively.
C. Efficiency of microfinance institutions with heterogenous preferences and output mixes
What remains then, is the operationalization of our model for a multi-
output/multi-input setting, while accounting for and measuring possible inef-
ficiencies. In fact, we can easily build on existing models for this. To start, re-
consider equation 1 and let P(Y) denote the set of feasible output vectors for an
4Note that here we can explain why the relationship between average loan size and the number of loans
can be characterized by the down-ward sloping curve in Figure 1. After all, we can rewrite equation (3) as
GLP
NL = ALS =
f (X)
Ry ·NL . It is straightforward to see that
∂ALS
∂NL = − 1NL2
f (X)
Ry , which explains the curvature in
Figure 1. The same curvature is also crucial for our interpretation of inefficiency: if we take a linear com-
bination between yˆNP and yˆFP, then of course MFIs that are in between are inefficient. More specifically, the
curvature reflects the fact that their are some limits to free disposability of outputs, and as a result such a linear
combination is not (always) feasible (Bogetoft and Wang, 2005).
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input vector X. We can then define the distance to the frontier as:
(4) D0(X, Y) = min.
{
Ψ > 0 :
Y
Ψ
∈ P(X)
}
,
where equation (4) is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and con-
vex in outputs, and decreasing in inputs. This so-called distance function takes a
value of one if an output combination lies on the production frontier, otherwise
its value is less than one, with D0(X, Y) if Y ∈ P(X).
As shown by Cuesta and Orea (2002) and others, D0(X, Y) is the inverse of the
well-known output-oriented Farrell measure of operational efficiency. There-
fore, an efficiency measure of one means that an MFI is fully efficient. In order
to parametrize equation (4), we need to impose linear homogeneity in outputs,
which we can do by scaling each output by one of the outputs. If we then use
a translog functional form to represent the technology, and include a series of
regulation dummies (Dlegal) to account for different types of institutions as in
Hermes, Lensink and Meesters (2011), we can write the output distance function
as:5
− ln(yit) =αi +
3
∑
k=1
αk ln xkit +
2
∑
j=1
β j ln y∗jit +
1
2
3
∑
k=1
3
∑
h=1
αkh ln xkit ln xhit
+
1
2
2
∑
j=1
2
∑
h=1
β jh ln y∗jit ln y
∗
hit +
3
∑
k=1
2
∑
j=1
αkh ln xkit ln y∗hit
+
3
∑
k=1
4
∑
legal=1
ζkiDlegal ln xkit +
2
∑
j=1
4
∑
legal=1
τjiDlegal ln y∗jit + uit + vit,
(5)
where ln(yit) is ln(ALSit) and y∗jit represents Yieldit and NLit, respectively, scaled
by yit. The composite error term uit + vit consists of a standard noise term noise
term, vit, and an inefficiency component uit ≥ 0, which is assumed to be i.i.d.,
with a distribution truncated at µ, |N(µ, σ2u)|, and independent from the noise
term.6 Efficiency is 0 ≤ exp{−uit} ≤ 1, where exp{−uit} = 1 implies full
efficiency.
We include legal dummies interacted with inputs and outputs to capture the
fact that MFIs with different legal status may fact different constraints, result-
ing in different technologies. The direct effect is captured by firm-specific fixed
effects αit, measured using Greene’s (2005b) true fixed effect frontier estimator.
5To correct for spurious interaction terms, all variables in the translog have been transformed following
the Frisch-Waugh theorem.
6In estimating equation (4), we identify the components of the composite error term by re-parameterizing
λ in a maximum likelihood procedure, where λ (= σu/σv) is the ratio of the standard deviation of efficiency
over the standard deviation of the noise term, and σ (= (σ2u + σ2v )1/2) is the composite standard deviation.
The frontier can be identified by the λ for which the log likelihood is maximized (see Kumbhakar and Lovell,
2000).
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Following Fa¨re and Primont (1996), the output distance function should be
non-decreasing in outputs and decreasing in inputs. We can verify whether this
holds, by evaluating the sum of the estimated input elasticities:7
(6) −
M
∑
k=1
δ ln D0(yit, xit)/δ ln xit.
At the means of outputs and inputs, we expect a value significantly greater than
one, indicating increasing scale economies. Likewise, to investigate the presence
of trade-offs between MFIs’ outputs, we evaluate:
(7) δ ln D0(yit, xit)/δ ln yjt for i 6= j,
where a negative value indicates the existence of a trade-off.
Finally, in order to assess how MFIs can become more efficient, we follow Bat-
tese and Coelli (1988), and condition µ, the truncation point for the inefficiency
distribution, as follows:8
µit =δ0 + δ1ln(Riskit) + δ2ln(Balanceit) + δ3ln(Repeated-Lendingit),(8)
where Riskit is the percentage of the portfolio at risk, measured as PAR30it ·
Gross Loan Portfolioit, where PAR30it is the percentage of the loan portfolio that
has at least one more installment of the principal past due more than 30 days.
We condition efficiency on risk, in order to account for the fact that performance
may simply reflect risk-taking. Balanceit reflects the fact that at least 50 percent
of MFIs’ lending is to female borrowers, as part of their mission to support their
development. It is measured as the percentage of female borrowers, and is in-
tended to account for the fact that in reaching out to female borrowers, MFIs may
constrain their loan portfolio choice, possibly resulting in less efficient output
mixes. Finally, we condition on Repeated-Lendingit, measured as the average
number of loans per borrower. As MFIs rely more on previous borrowers in-
stead of new ones, they might reduce their outreach, but increase their efficiency
by cutting screening costs.
Summing up, we have now developed an empirical model that allows us to
explore the trade-off between financial performance and social performance, to
benchmark the efficiency of MFIs, and to assess the factors that can improve that
efficiency. In the next section, we introduce our data.
IV. Data
We use the data from the Microfinance Information Exchange market
(www.mix.org). The MIX dataset collects self-reported balance sheet informa-
7We add the minus sign for the dependent variable in line with equation (4).
8To control for possible multicollinearity, the variables that explain µ have been orthogonalized.
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tion and is widely used in the literature (Cull, Demirg-Kunt and Morduch, 2009;
Ahlin, Lin and Maio, 2011; Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011; Roberts, 2012).
In total, MIX includes 1,146 MFIs, over the period 2003-2010. After eliminating
outliers, we have an unbalanced panel with 3,890 observations.9 Table 2 reports
mean values, sorted by the legal status of the institution.10
Table 2—: Descriptive statistics for different types of MFIs
Bank Cooperative NBFI NGO Other Rural Bank
O
utputs
(Y
)
Average Loan Balance / GNI 1.486 0.886 0.596 0.343 0.186 0.451
(2.588) (1.021) ( 0.791) (0.607) ( 0.149) ( 0.372)
Number of Loans (NL) 83065.390 14486.311 53832.367 45667.140 2909.500 22577.547
(115287.906) (24376.549) (117252.275) (86264.250) (2860.247) (36390.681)
Yield on gross loan portfolio (Yglp) 0.230 0.155 0.260 0.268 0.262 0.224
(0.152) (0.087) (0.149) (0.154) (0.085) (0.100)
Inputs
(X
)
Financial expenses (FiExp/Ass) 0.058 0.053 0.058 0.048 0.103 0.050
(0.031) (0.049) (0.033) (0.030) (0.004) (0.026)
Personnel expenses (PExp/Ass) 0.084 0.054 0.102 0.114 0.122 0.067
(0.044) (0.033) (0.064) (0.069) (0.064) (0.032)
Administrative expenses (AdExp/Ass) 0.076 0.055 0.080 0.082 0.086 0.062
(0.054) (0.036) (0.051) (0.058) (0.056) (0.034)
D
eterm
inants
(Z
)
Risk 0.051 0.067 0.052 0.058 0.148 0.100
(0.075) (0.065) (0.064) (0.075) (0.039) (0.086)
Balance 53.003 48.784 61.071 73.484 61.130 51.987
(21.475) (19.882) (24.441) (23.046) (20.761) (27.815)
Multiple lending 1.069 1.067 1.053 1.051 1.000 1.059
(0.111) (0.206) (0.191) (0.254) (0.000) (0.135)
C
osts
Costs per borrower 297.136 233.755 231.545 130.605 105.000 107.219
(281.549) (176.063) (547.116) (236.798) (25.456) (77.837)
Costs per loan 282.502 220.937 220.242 118.811 105.000 103.380
(276.426) (166.491) (538.374) (129.898) (25.456) (77.018)
Total expenses 23.740 17.482 25.947 26.414 33.635 18.693
(9.851) (8.078) (12.062) (12.814) (15.408) (6.754)
Number of observations 259 490 1,236 1,551 14 177
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses; all monetary values in USD, corrected for inflation. Cooperative is a
cooperative or a credit union; NBFI is a non-bank financial institution; NGO is a non-governmental organisa-
tion. Average loan size in USD. Yield on gross loan portfolio: one percent is 0.01. Inputs are scaled by assets
for comparative purposes, but included non-scaled in the estimations of the output distance frontier. Portfolio
at risk, 30 days late for payment. Multiple lending is defined as number of loans over number of borrowers.
3,727 observations in total.
The first thing to observe from Table 2, is the large heterogeneity among MFIs.
On the one end of the spectrum, we find banks, who are the largest institutions
in the sample, offer largest loans and seem to be indifferent between lending
to men or women. Despite the fact that banks on average give out large loans,
9We exclude the top and bottom percentiles.
10MIX contains MFIs from 101 countries. We control for country effects through firm-specific fixed effects.
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they have relatively high costs per borrower, suggesting that they are not able to
benefit from economies of scale. Nevertheless, and consistent with their profit
motive, banks have a high yield on gross loan portfolio (although it is not the
highest).
On the other end of the spectrum we have rural banks, who despite their small
size and small loans have low costs per borrower and a lower yield. Credit
unions are the best performers in terms of affordability and profitability, but offer
some of the largest loans. Both credit unions and non-bank financial institutions
(NBFI) are relatively smaller in size, but NBFIs offer smaller loans, which in turn
leads to higher yield on gross portfolio. NGOs are the smallest institutions, offer
the smallest loans and almost three quarters of their borrowers are women. The
cost per borrower reported by NGOs is one of the lowest, but at the same time
the yield on gross portfolio is the highest in the sample.
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 2, we can observe that it is not obvi-
ous that there are economies of scale, since larger institutions do not report lower
average costs. Also, for-profit institutions do not report lower total expenses or
average costs, invalidating claims of superior management quality. In addition,
institutions that offer larger loans tend to charge lower interest rates. Finally,
high yields on gross portfolio seem to be unrelated to costs per borrower, but
might instead be a consequence of the higher credit risk of smaller loans.
Nevertheless, these results need to be interpreted carefully for two reasons.
First, low costs per borrowers reported by NGOs and Rural Banks will be influ-
enced by subsidies, for which we have no data. Second, a significant number
of institutions may be operating inside the production possibility frontier and
might still be able to improve their performance in multiple dimensions.
The evidence reported in Table 2 supports the empirical specification of our
model. It shows that there are indeed strong differences in the gross loan portfo-
lio composition, costs and yield among MFIs. This justifies the use of a produc-
tion function with multiple outputs. Additionally, the heterogeneity across legal
statuses gives reasons for using institution type dummies in the specification of
the output distance function.
V. Results
We begin this section with a brief description of the estimation of the multi-
output, multi-input production frontier. Next, we explore the relationship be-
tween the choice of output mix, business models and MFIs’ efficiency.
A. Estimation results
We start by estimating the output distance frontier. Table A.1 in the Appendix
contains the estimation results for our output distance frontier model, while Fig-
ure 2 below shows the resulting distribution of efficiency. Importantly, we in-
clude MFI-specific fixed effects to account for firm- and country-specific condi-
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tions that may affect the production process.11
Figure 2. : Distribution of efficiency
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Before we delve into the implications of these estimation results for different
groups of MFIs, a logical first question is whether efficiency matters? In Table
A.1, we therefore focus on λ, the ratio of inefficiency and noise. The estimated λ
of 2.5600 demonstrates that there is a considerable amount of inefficiency: more
than 70 percent of the 'unexplained' variance is the result of efficiency differ-
ences.12
The resulting efficiency scores are portrayed in Figure 2. On average, MFIs are
83% efficient, meaning they should be able to produce 17% more outputs (given
their output mix), based on what their peers operating at the frontier are able to
produce, with the same input mix. Finally, we observe that efficiency is by no
means normally distributed, something we have to take into account later when
we do formal testing and when we calculate marginal effects.
B. Analysis
Now that we have estimated the output distance frontier, we can begin our
analysis of the relationship between output mixes, business models and effi-
ciency. We start by exploring the trade-off between financial and social perfor-
mance. Next, we examine how MFIs’ observed output mix is related to efficiency.
Subsequently, we find out whether it matters if that output mix is in line with
MFIs’ business model. Our final exploration concerns the ways in which MFIs
can improve efficiency for a given output mix.
11These fixed effects are not included in Table A.1, but available upon request from the authors. Because of
the nature of the translog model, interpreting individual coefficients is notoriously cumbersome. Instead we
report input and output elasticities in Table 3 and discuss them in the next subsection.
12Since λ = σu/σv, a λ of 2.5600 means that σu/(σu + σv)=0.72.
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WHAT IS THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE?
Our description of the production process in Section III suggested that there
may be a trade-off between financial and social performance. If the latter is re-
flected in giving many small loans to the poor, then it may for example result
in higher operational costs and lower profit margins. This forces MFIs to raise
interest rates resulting in more profitable, but less affordable loans. In the same
vein, increasing the size of loans might allow MFIs to cut costs, attract commer-
cial funding and serve more borrowers in the future (Hulme, Mosley et al., 1996;
Copestake, 2007). Summing up, the larger the trade-off is, the more it matters
whether MFIs produce an output mix that is in line with their business model.
And the more the trade-off varies with output levels, the higher the penalty of
drifting away from that business model may be.
Table 3—: Output trade-offs and scale economies
Elasticity Mean p-value
Y Elasticity with respect to yield on gross loan portfolio (εYGLP ) -0.195 0.000
Elasticity with respect to number of loans (εNL) -0.693 0.000
X
Elasticity to financial expenses 0.344 0.000
Elasticity to administrative expenses 0.019 0.475
Elasticity to personel expenses 0.563 0.000
Scale economies (= total input elasticity) 0.923 0.000
Note: Number of observations is 3,737. Elasticities calculated as complete partial differential with respect to
output, respectively input. All p-values for null hypothesis that elasticity is equal to zero, except for total
input elasticity (equal to one).
To find out what kind of trade-offs exist in the production process of MFIs, we
calculate input and output elasticities from the estimated output distance fron-
tier. The resulting average elasticities are reported in Table 3. From the table, we
observe that both the number of loans and the yield on the gross-loan portfolio
are substitutes to the average loan size. The output trade-offs in Table 3 confirm
our expectations: in changing their output mix, MFIs are on average required
to give up some characteristic of their current mix in order to gain in another
dimension.
Our results indicate that the MFIs that target the very poor are able to do so
only by charging higher interest rates, reflected in the negative elasticity of aver-
age loan size to yield on gross portfolio. Consistent with Conning (1999), depth
of outreach often comes at the cost of affordability, but as Figure 3a shows for
some MFIs the substitution elasticity of average loan size and the yield on the
gross loan portfolio is either zero or positive, meaning that they are able to serve
the poor without necessarily charging higher interest rates. Finally, we show
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Figure 3. : Output substitution elasticities
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that mission drift always leads to a decrease in breadth of outreach, reflected in
the consistently negative substitution elasticity of average loan size and number
of loans in Figure 3b. If MFIs want to serve richer clients by disbursing larger
loans they are able to so only by reducing the number of loans, a trade-off that
becomes even stronger as loan size increases.
The fact that an increase in the the number of loans is accompanied by a
smaller average loan size and a higher yield for the gross loan portfolio may
to some extent be explained by diseconomies of scale in production. In order
to find out whether this is the case, we calculate input price elasticities in the
lower half of Table 3. For our translog specification, the sum of these elasticities
is a measure of MFIs’ scale economies in production. Indeed, we find that on
average MFIs experience scale economies that are significantly below unity, in-
dicative of diseconomies of scale, and perhaps the result of the challenges that
MFIs face when growing, such as saturated markets, less effective monitoring
and lack of adequate human resources (Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Mark Schreiner,
Richard L Meyer, Jorge Rodriguez-Meza and Sergio Navajas, 1997).
Summing up, we find that there are significant trade-offs in the production of
MFIs. Next, we find out whether these trade-offs affect the efficiency of different
business models.
DOES MFIS’ SOCIAL MISSION AFFECT EFFICIENCY?
Now that we have established that there are significant output mix trade-offs,
we can determine whether MFIs’ efficiency is affected by the breadth and depth
of their outreach. To do so, and to avoid engineering our results, we adopt the
same categorization provided by the MIX, and sort MFIs according to their depth
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and breadth of outreach, respectively.13 First, we ask whether each (depth and
breadth) affects efficiency, then we study the impact of different mixes of depth
and breadth of outreach on efficiency.
We start, in Table 4, with a comparison of the level and spread of efficiency for
different degrees of outreach. As discussed in the previous section, the efficiency
scores are not normally distributed. We therefore use a Kruskal Wallis (KW) rank
test to compare differences in levels.
Table 4a focuses on the breadth of outreach, defined as the number of ac-
tive borrowers. Of course, by construction the concept of breadth of outreach
is strongly correlated with the size of the institution. From the KW test statis-
tics, we see that there is no significant difference in efficiency between MFIs
with different breadth of outreach, confirming that size and efficiency are not
(cor)related. Does this also imply that the ease with which an MFI reaches that
average efficiency is not dependent on the breadth of outreach? In order to an-
swer that question, we compare the spread of efficiency scores for different levels
of outreach. Our results are straightforward: the higher the breadth of outreach,
the more efficiency varies. MFIs that serve a smaller amount of borrowers oper-
ate more narrowly around the frontier.
Table 4—: Level of Outreach and Efficiency
(a) Breadth of outreach and efficiency
Breadth of outreach N Mean KW(S−M) KW(M−L) KW(L−S) St.Dev F(S−M) F(M−L) F(L−S)
Small breadth (S) 1,670 0.841 0.621 . . 0.108 0.000 . .
Medium breadth (M) 988 0.826 . 0.796 . 0.139 . 0.000 .
Large breadth (L) 1,069 0.815 . . 0.783 0.159 . . 0.000
(b) Depth of outreach and efficiency
Target market N Mean KW(L−B) KW(B−H) KW(H−S) KW(S−L) St.Dev F(L−B) F(B−H) F(H−S) F(S−L)
Low end (L) 1,558 0.879 0.000 . . . 0.105 0.000 . . .
Broad (B) 1,848 0.799 . 0.000 . . 0.138 . 0.031 . .
High end (H) 185 0.747 . . 0.176 . 0.154 . . 0.337 .
Small business (S) 113 0.776 . . . 0.000 0.133 . . . 0.000
Note: KW = Kruskal Wallis rank test, p-values reported; F = F test for the homogeneity of variances, p-values
reported. Depth of outreach, represented by the target market, is measured as average loan balance per bor-
rower/GNI per capita.
In Table 4b, we repeat the analysis and look at the efficiency of MFIs with dif-
ferent levels of depth of outreach. Here, we measure the latter, in line with the
13Depth of outreach is defined as target market by the MIX, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
Definition of groups can be found in Table A.2.
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categorization of MIX, as on average loan size over per capita Gross National
Income (GNI). Importantly, the overwhelming majority of MFIs in our dataset
offers loans below 149% of GNI per capita. The mean efficiency scores clearly
show that MFIs that offer larger loans are significantly less efficient. The largest
drop in efficiency (of 8%) is observed between low end and broad targeting,
while there is no significant difference between high end and small business tar-
geting. We can detect the same pattern in the spread of efficiency scores, with
a large increase between low end and broad and no significant difference be-
tween high end and small business. Thus, for MFIs that focus on the very poor
efficiency is not only higher but also more easily achievable.
These results have important implications for the discussion around mission
drift as they do not support the claim that MFIs moving upmarket are able to
increase efficiency. In fact, if increasing loans size is the response to competition
with profit oriented institutions (Ghosh and Tassel, 2008), it is the wrong one.
We find opposite results to Hermes, Lensink and Meesters (2011), who do not
specifically take into account the multi-output nature of microfinance.
So far, then, our results show that whereas increasing the breadth of outreach
does not affect the level of efficiency, increasing the depth of outreach does. Ear-
lier, we found that there is a significant trade-off between breadth and depth
of outreach. Combining both results leads to logical next question: what is the
optimal mix of breadth and depth of outreach?
Table 5—: Trade-offs in Outreach and Efficiency
Target market Breadth of outreach N Mean KW(S−M) KW(M−L) KW(L−S) St.Dev F(S−M) F(M−L) F(L−S)
Low end
Small (S) 520 0.882 0.000 . . 0.083 0.913 . .
Medium (M) 446 0.897 . 0.052 . 0.083 . 0.000 .
Large (L) 592 0.861 . . 0.092 0.131 . . 0.000
Broad target
Small (S) 959 0.828 0.000 . . 0.108 0.000 . .
Medium (M) 478 0.768 . 0.401 . 0.149 . 0.001 .
Large (L) 411 0.768 . . 0.000 0.170 . . 0.000
High end
Small (S) 85 0.786 0.377 . . 0.130 0.896 . .
Medium (M) 42 0.759 . 0.013 . 0.152 . 0.044 .
Large (L) 58 0.680 . . 0.000 0.168 . . 0.003
Small business
Small (S) 84 0.775 0.491 . . 0.129 0.358 . .
Medium (M) 21 0.791 . 0.316 . 0.161 . 0.167 .
Large (L) 8 0.739 . . 0.454 0.102 . . 0.118
Note: KW = Kruskal Wallis rank test, p-values reported; F = F test for the homogeneity of variances, p-values
reported. Depth of outreach, represented by the target market, is measured as average loan balance per bor-
rower/GNI per capita.
To answer this question, we look at the combination of depth and breadth of
outreach in Table 5. From that table, we observe that the majority of MFIs no
20
longer serve the very poor, but instead supply loans to a broad(er) target.14 In
line with previous results (Bassem, 2008), we find that for all levels of depth of
outreach, MFIs with a low end target are more efficient. In fact, the smallest
institutions that serve the poor are still able to operate well above the mean effi-
ciency of 83%. Almost all other MFIs offering larger loans operate below mean
efficiency. The least efficient group consists of MFIs with a large number of high
end clients, and includes the largest lenders in the sample. Overall, it appears
that MFIs with a medium to large breadth of outreach and a high depth of out-
reach (i.e., serving the low end of the market) are most efficient.
A similar pattern emerges, when we consider the distribution of efficiency.
MFIs that serve the poor show the lowest dispersion of efficiency around the
frontier. In most cases, the spread of efficiency increases with both the average
size of loans and the number of clients. Inefficiencies related to mission drift
become more severe as MFIs start serving more borrowers. MFIs offering many
large loans should do so because of economies of scale (Copestake, 2007), but
appear to pay a price in terms of lower efficiency. A possible explanation is that
MFIs in the last two groups (high end and small business) face more competi-
tion from traditional banks. A harsher competitive environment means a more
saturated market and riskier new borrowers (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997).
DOES MFIS’ SOCIAL MISSION AFFECT THE TRADE OFF?
In section III.A and Figure 3, we first hypothesize and then show that output
trade-offs vary depending on MFIs’ business models. In this section we explore
how those trade-offs vary among MFIs with different breadth and depth of out-
reach and whether this has any influence on efficiency. In Tables 6 and 7, we
therefore compare MFIs with different levels of outreach. For each level, we
compare firms with an average elasticity of output substitution to those with a
high or a low elasticity.
In Table 6, we focus on breadth of outreach. From panel A we see that the
majority of MFIs that serve a small number of clients can increase the depth
of outreach without large increases in the price of the loans, as a result of low
elasticities of substitution. This is to be expected as small MFIs are usually non-
profit or institutions in their infancy and will prefer to offer more affordable
loans. Nevertheless when elasticity is lowest for small MFIs, so is efficiency.
When the number of clients increases, both funding constraints and competition
will increase, leading to less discretion in setting prices for a given loan size.
We find evidence of this as the frequency of MFIs operating subject to a high
elasticity increases with breadth of outreach.
The story changes in panel B, where a high elasticity of substitution is more
common for MFIs with small breadth. For this group, with a small loan port-
14As yet, however, only a few MFIs serve small businesses.
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Table 6—: Trade Off and Breadth of Outreach
A. Yield (YRGP) B. Number of Loans (NL)
Breadth of Outreach Elasticity N εYRGP Mean (KW) N εYNL Mean (KW)
Small breadth
Low 1151 -0.088 0.837*** (0.002) 151 -0.615 0.919*** (0.000)
Medium 480 -0.193 0.849 450 -0.699 0.887
High 29 -0.265 0.853 (0.539) 1059 -0.814 0.809*** (0.000)
Medium breadth
Low 74 -0.134 0.844*** (0.004) 291 -0.611 0.922*** (0.000)
Medium 617 -0.212 0.810 543 -0.691 0.801
High 293 -0.261 0.855*** (0.000) 150 -0.766 0.730*** (0.000)
Large breadth
Low 12 -0.132 0.870 (0.451) 795 -0.568 0.839*** (0.000)
Medium 141 -0.216 0.815 245 -0.678 0.732
High 916 -0.302 0.814 (0.900) 29 -0.765 0.845*** (0.000)
Note: */*/*** signifies significant difference with middle tertile at the 1/5/10% level. Kruskal-Wallis rank test
for efficiency levels.
folio, any increase in average loan size will result in a much larger decrease in
the number of loans disbursed. As the size of the loan portfolio increases, more
MFIs are able to relax the relationship between breadth and depth of outreach.
As a result, the consequences of mission drift are worst for small MFIs who suf-
fer a large drop in breadth of outreach. The most interesting observation from
panel B is that very efficient MFIs are able to operate with a low elasticity of sub-
stitution between breadth and depth of outreach, implying that small MFIs are
not doomed to operate within narrow boundaries but are able to considerably
increase their impact through improvements in efficiency.
Table 7—: Trade Off and Depth of Outreach
A. Yield (YRGP) B. Number of Loans (NL)
Target market Elasticity N εYRGP Mean (KW) N εYNL Mean (KW)
Low end
Low 336 -0.109 0.888 (0.309) 929 -0.577 0.889*** (0.000)
Medium 507 -0.206 0.887 426 -0.684 0.877
High 706 -0.297 0.868 (0.444) 194 -0.778 0.830*** (0.000)
Broad
Low 755 -0.085 0.826*** (0.000) 290 -0.605 0.803* (0.057)
Medium 634 -0.204 0.786 717 -0.696 0.798
High 457 -0.284 0.771 (0.367) 839 -0.808 0.799 (0.169)
High end
Low 69 -0.079 0.784* (0.075) 5 -0.623 0.698 (0.881)
Medium 60 -0.208 0.740 80 -0.693 0.706
High 55 -0.273 0.706 (0.140) 99 -0.819 0.781*** (0.001)
Small business
Low 69 -0.082 0.764 (0.173) 0
Medium 33 -0.202 0.796 12 -0.692 0.709
High 10 -0.283 0.774 (0.863) 100 -0.842 0.782 (0.165)
Note: */*/*** signifies significant difference with middle tertile at the 1/5/10% level. Kruskal-Wallis rank test
for efficiency levels.
In Table 7, we look at how MFIs with different depths of outreach are affect
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by changing output trade-offs. We find that as MFIs drift away from serving the
poorest, they face a stronger trade off between depth of outreach and the yield
on their gross loan portfolio. Within a MFIs with the same target group there is
little variation in efficiency. However, efficiency agrees as MFIs start targeting
the poor. Moving to Panel B, we observe that for the majority of MFIs efficiency
decreases as the trade-off with the number of loans increases, mimicking the
results from6. Changing target group, however, does not have a strong impact
on this observation.
Summing up, we see that MFIs with different business models will, to a large
extent, face different trade-offs. In line with Figure 3, we find that MFIs with
different mixes of breadth and depth of outreach face very different trade-offs
with respect to the yield on gross portfolio. Most importantly, however, very
efficient MFIs are able to relax the rigid relationship between breadth and depth
of outreach, and - at least along these dimensions - can have the best of both
worlds.
CAN MFIS IMPROVE THEIR EFFICIENCY FOR A GIVEN OUTPUT MIX?
This brings us to our final question: how then can MFIs improve their effi-
ciency for a given output mix? In order to answer that question, we assess
the impact of a number of operational choices on MFIs’ efficiency. We do so
by conditioning the distribution of efficiency scores on three variables that are
under the direct control of the management of an MFI. After all, in an increas-
ingly crowded industry such as microfinance, searching for ways to improve ef-
ficiency without changing current business may be crucial. Each of the variables
we consider relate to a re-balancing of MFIs’ loan portfolio, in order to improve
operational efficiency.
First, we consider the risk of MFIs’ loan portfolio, measured as the dollar
amount of the portfolio that has at least one more instalment of the principal
past due more than 30 days. The amount of portfolio in default measures port-
folio quality and risk attitude of the MFIs. Lenders can increase their portfolio
quality by requiring collateral and engaging in more screening and monitoring.
Nevertheless, MFIs usually operate in the absence of collateral, in markets where
severe information asymmetry makes screening and monitoring very costly. Ac-
cording to Von Pischke (1996), the probability of lending to risky borrowers in-
creases with breadth of outreach. Table 8 contains our estimation results. In the
table, we report both the estimated coefficient (for inefficiency), as well as the de-
rived average partial effect on efficiency, following Greene (2007).15 From Table
8, we observe that increasing risk lowers efficiency.
Another way in which MFIs can rebalance their portfolios, is by changing the
percentage of women borrowers. Since almost all types of MFIs on average lend
15Note that the latter can be significant even when the former is not, implying that very high and/or low
values of the conditioning variable do not have a significant effect.
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Table 8—: Operational determinants of efficiency
Estimation output Marginal effect on efficiency
Variables Coefficient (Std. error) Partial effect (Std. error)
Constant -0.9415*** (0.2342)
Risk ln(PAR30 · GrossLoanPort f olio) 0.4379*** (0.0613) -0.0071*** (0.0027)
Balance ln(%Women · Borrowers) -0.3543*** (0.0779) 0.0060*** (0.0022)
Multiple lending ln(Loans/Borrowers) -0.0807 (0.0742) 0.0011*** (0.0002)
more than 50% to women, rebalancing in many cases would involve lowering
the share of loans to women. However, the number of women borrowers is an
alternative measure of depth of outreach of the MFI (Schreiner, 2002; Hermes,
Lensink and Meesters, 2011). From the summary statistics in Table 2 we can
observe how NGOs and Rural Banks have comparable level of depth of outreach,
but are strongly different when it comes to the percentage of women borrowers.
This is an indication of how relevant the original social mission of microfinance
is for the institution. Changing the loan portfolio towards woman borrowers,
however, increases efficiency. This finding is in line with D’Espallier, Gue´rin
and Mersland (2011) who find that women are better borrowers, but it is not
consistent with Hermes, Lensink and Meesters (2011).
Finally, MFIs can change the composition of their loan portfolios through re-
peat lending. An advantage of granting multiple loans to the same borrower, is
the fact that both MFI and borrower can use the relationship they built to lower
asymmetric information. A disadvantage, however, is a decrease in outreach,
as fewer borrowers receive loans, ceteris paribus. We introduce the ratio of the
number of loans to the number of borrowers as a rough measure of the over-
lending of an MFI. Even if over-indebtedness in microfinance is a hotly debated
topic (Schicks, 2010), it is a concept hard to define, let alone measure (Alam,
2012). We simply try to identify institutions that are willing to disburse multiple
loans for each borrower. Interestingly, multiple lending has a positive coefficient.
This is surprising at first but it might be consistent with the fact that it is cheaper
for MFIs to screen and monitor returning borrowers.
Concluding, if MFIs are looking at improving their efficiency without neces-
sarily changing their output mix, they should reduce portfolio risk, increase the
number of women borrowers and to a greater extent rely on longer relationships
with borrowers.
VI. Conclusion
The idea behind microfinance is quite simple: to provide financial services to
the poor. In reality, its application is everything but simple. As the microfinance
sector evolves, it has become an example of a sector in which firms with different
business models coexist. Next to pure for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs),
the sector has room for non-profit organizations, and includes 'social' for-profit
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firms that aim to maximize a double bottom line and do well while doing good.
We introduce a benchmarking approach that accommodates these three busi-
ness models and allows us to estimate the efficiency of MFIs while taking into
account multiple dimensions of output. Our approach allows us to benchmark
institutions with different preferences without a priori selecting a performance
measure that would favor the financial or the social bottom line.
Our empirical results show that there are significant trade-offs between social
and financial performance in microfinance. These trade-offs do not necessarily
affect all MFIs in the same manner and can be reduced by highly efficient insti-
tutions. Preferences have a strong impact on performance as efficiency decreases
when MFIs move away from their original business model, in particular when
MFIs drift away from either depth or breadth of outreach. Increasing the risk of
the loan portfolio reduces efficiency and lending to woman increases efficiency.
Finally, our finding that multiple lending to borrowers is efficiency-enhancing
may help explain the mission drift in microfinance.
Our analysis has important consequences for researchers, investors and prac-
titioners. Research-wise, our results demonstrate that the inefficiencies found in
the literature may to quite some extent be rational, and result from comparing
MFIs to a benchmark that is not in line with their business model. For exam-
ple, a non-profit MFI that is not very profitable, but maximizes its depth and
breadth of outreach, will be very inefficient when assessed using a traditional
banking approach, and highly efficient when subjected to an impact analysis.
Our approach shows the importance of accounting for the multiple dimensions
of microfinance, and underlines the power of the balanced scorecard.
For investors, our results should be food for thought. An investor whose main
aim is to diversify and invest a share of her wealth in an MFI, should invest
in one of the most efficient pure for-profit MFIs, in order to get the most 'bang
for the buck.' Likewise, an NGO investing to maximize impact, should invest in
an efficient non-profit MFI. Most interesting, however, is the case of the 'social'
investor, who wants to do well while doing good: whereas this investor may be
inclined to invest in a social for-profit MFI, our results suggest that this can be
suboptimal. Instead, this investor may find higher returns (both financial and
non-financial), by investing part of her wealth in an efficient for-profit MFI, and
the remaining part in an efficient non-profit MFI.
Finally, for MFI practitioners the implications of our results are straightfor-
ward: in the absence of major changes in output mixes (or business models), the
institutions in our sample are the most efficient when doing what they do best.
For non-profit MFIs this means offering relatively expensive loans to the poor.
Moving towards better off clients in an attempt to reap the benefits of economies
of scale, lower risk and profit oriented investments leads to an inefficient use
of resources. Whether this is the effect of subsidies, lack of managerial skills or
changing market conditions, we do not know. What we do know, is that for a
given output mix, all MFIs can gain by being more selective in their lending, and
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more carefully weighing the risk, background and indebtedness of their borrow-
ers.
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Appendix
Table A.1—: Output distance frontier results
Variable Parameter Std.Error
Deterministic Component of Stochastic Frontier Model
constant 2.6950*** (0.0413)
ln(number of loans) -1.0385*** (0.0152)
ln(yield) 0.0455*** (0.0075)
ln(financial expenses) -0.0281*** (0.0040)
ln(adminstrative expenses) 0.0165 (0.0236)
ln(personnel expenses) -0.2002*** (0.0276)
½ln(number of loans)2 0.0403*** (0.00418)
½ln(yield)2 -0.0235*** (0.0017)
½ln(financial expenses)2 0.0553*** (0.0014)
½ln(administrative expenses)2 0.0007 (0.0061)
½ln(personnel expenses)2 0.0925*** (0.0067)
ln(number of loans)×ln(yield) 0.0016*** (0.0001)
ln(number of loans)×ln(financial expenses) 0.0005*** (0.0001)
ln(number of loans)×ln(adminstrative expenses) 0.0010*** (0.0003)
ln(number of loans)×ln(personnel expenses) -0.0009 (0.0003)
ln(yield)×ln(financial expenses) -0.0003*** (0.0001)
ln(yield)×ln(administrative expenses) 0.0002 (0.00016)
ln(yield)×ln(personnel expenses) 0.0002 (0.0002)
ln(financial expenses)×ln(administrative expenses) -0.0002 (0.0002)
ln(financial expenses)×ln(personnel expenses) -0.0003* (0.0002)
ln(administrative expenses)×ln(personnel expenses) -0.0008** (0.0002)
ln(number of loans)×DBank 0.0002 (0.0032)
ln(number of loans)×DCooperative or credit union 0.0021 (0.0030)
ln(number of loans)×DNon-bank financial institution 0.0105*** (0.0028)
ln(number of loans)×DRural bank 0.0093 (0.0104)
ln(yield)×DBank -0.0010 (0.0020)
ln(yield)×DCooperative or credit union 0.0044*** (0.0018)
ln(yield)×DNon-bank financial institution 0.0007 (0.0018)
ln(yield)×DRural bank -0.0068 (0.0052)
ln(financial expenses)×DBank 0.0022 (0.0023)
ln(financial expenses)×DCooperative or credit union -0.0222*** (0.0019)
ln(financial expenses)×DNon-bank financial institution -0.0082*** (0.0013)
ln(financial expenses)×DRural bank 0.0039 (0.0033)
ln(adminstrative expenses)×DBank 0.0108* (0.0060)
ln(adminstrative expenses)×DCooperative or credit union 0.0110*** (0.0037)
ln(adminstrative expenses)×DNon-bank financial institution 0.0083 (0.0052)
ln(adminstrative expenses)×DRural bank 0.0134 (0.0161)
ln(personnel expenses)×DBank -0.0226*** (0.0052)
ln(personnel expenses)×DCooperative or credit union -0.0086** (0.0041)
ln(personnel expenses)×DNon-bank financial institution -0.0112** (0.0052)
ln(personnel expenses)×DRural bank -0.0185 (0.0195)
Variance parameters for compound error
λ 2.5600*** (0.2611)
σu 0.3130*** (0.0196)
Note: Log likelihood function value is 1678.45564; Kodde and Palm (1986) test for wrongly skewed residuals,
at 95%=10.371, at 99%= 14.325. To correct for spurious interaction terms, all variables in the translog have
been transformed following the Frisch-Waugh theorem. To control for possible multicollinearity, the variables
that explain µ have been orthogonalized. λ = σu/σv, i.e., the ratio of inefficiency and noise. σu is the standard
deviation of (untransformed) inefficiency.
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Table A.2—: Group composition criteria
Characteristic Group Sorting criteria
Breadth of
outreach
Small Breadth Number of Borrowers < 10,000
Medium Breadth Number of Borrowers 10,000 to 30,000
Large Breadth Number of Borrowers > 30,000
Depth of
outreach
Low end Depth < 20% OR average loan size < USD 150
Broad Depth between 20% and 149%
High end Depth between 149% and 250%
Small Business Depth over 250%
Note: Depth = Avg. Loan Balance per Borrower/GNI per capita. Criteria defined at http://www.mixmarket.
org/about/faqs#calculations1
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